Showing posts with label Shock-Doctrine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Shock-Doctrine. Show all posts

Saturday, September 29, 2012

Why Wait for a Military Incident?


Patrick Clawson - a warmonger with a long catalogue of sins (see the entry in the Right Web) - explains "the traditional way that America gets into war" as follows.

"I frankly find that crisis initiation is really tough. And it’s very hard for me to see how the United States President can get us into war with Iran. Which leads me to conclude that if in fact compromise is not coming that the traditional way that America gets into war is what would be best for U.S. interests.
Some people might think that Mr. Roosevelt wanted to get us into World War II, as David mentioned, you may recall we had to wait for Pearl Harbor. Some people think Mr. Wilson wanted to get us into World War I, you may recall we had to wait for the Lusitania episode. Some people might think that Mr. Johnson wanted to send troops to Vietnam, you may recall we had to wait for the Gulf of Tonkin episode. We didn’t go to war with Spain until the USS Maine exploded. And may I point out that Mr. Lincoln did not feel he could call out the Federal Army until Fort Sumter was attacked which is why he ordered the commander of Fort Sumter to do exactly that thing which the South Carolineans had said would cause an attack.
So if in fact the Iranians aren’t going to compromise, it would be best if somebody else started the war. One can combine other means of pressure with sanctions. I mentioned that explosion on August 17th. We could step up the pressure.
I mean look people, Iranian submarines periodically go down, some day one of them might not come up, who would know why? We could do a variety of things if we wish to to increase the pressure. I’m not advocating that, but I’m just suggesting that this is not an either or proposition, you know it’s just sanctions have to succeed or it’s other things.
We are in the games of using covert means against the Iranians. We could get nastier."

You're nasty enough, terrorizing the world.

There is a little historical distortion in what Clawson said. There is no real (or false-flag) military incident necessary. In fact, the US take ANY opportunity to start a war or send their troops, if it serves their interests (political and financial hegemony). Empires and hegemonic powers have always been opportunists, trying to take advantage of EVERY situation that comes along, and so does the US:

- There is an earth-quake? Let's go to Haiti!
- There are two airliners crashing into two sky scrapers and three buildings are coming down (like in a controlled demolition)? Let's go to Afghanistan!
- There is a heart-breaking story of Kuwaiti babies taken out of their incubators and left to die by Iraqi soldiers? Let's go to Iraq! (see Nayirah, a classic of war propaganda)
- Mhm, there is nothing? Let's apply the Cheney Doctrine and go again to Iraq!



See the video of Clawson's speech


Tuesday, December 7, 2010

Guns-to-Caviar Index / Kaviar-Kanonen-Index

[The Guns-to-Caviar Index] „tracks the sales of fighter jets (guns) and executive jets (caviar). For seventeen years, it consistently found that when fighter jets were selling briskly, sales of luxury executive jets went down and vice versa: when executive jet sales were on the rise, fighter jet sales dipped. Of course, a handful of war profiteers always managed to get rich from selling guns, but they were economically insignificant. It was a truism of the contemporary market that you couldn't have booming economic growth in the midst of violence and instability.
But that truism is no longer true. Since 2003, the year of the Iraq invasion, the index found that spending has been going up on both fighter jets and executive jets rapidly and simultaneously, which means that the world is becoming less peaceful while accumulating significantly more profit. The
galloping economic growth in China and India played a part in the increased demand for luxury items, but so did the expansion of the narrow military-industrial complex into the sprawling disaster capitalism complex. Today, global instability does not just benefit a small group of arms dealers; it generates huge profits for the high-tech security sector, for heavy construction, for private health care companies treating wounded soldiers, for the oil and gas sectors—and of course for defense contractors.“

Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine, Chapter 21: Loosing the Peace Incentive

[Der Kanonen-Kaviar-Index] „vergleicht die Verkaufszahlen von Kampf-flugzeugen (Kanonen) mit denen von Firmenjets (Kaviar). 17 Jahre lang zeigte sich zuverlässig die Gesetzmäßigkeit, dass die Zahl der verkauften Firmenjets deutlich nach unten ging, wenn Kampfflugzeuge Konjunktur hatten. Und umgekehrt: Wenn die Verkäufe von Firmenjets zunahmen, sackten die Umsätze bei Kampfflugzeugen ab. Natürlich schafften es  einige Kriegsgewinnler immer, mit dem Verkauf von Kanonen reich zu werden, aber die fielen volkswirtschaftlich nicht ins Gewicht. Es galt als Binsenweisheit der zeitgenössischen Wirtschaft, dass es in Zeiten von Gewalt und Instabilität kein nachhaltiges Wachstum geben könne.
Doch diese Binsenweisheit trifft nicht mehr zu. Seit 2003, dem Jahr des Einmarsches im Irak, zeigt der Index, dass sowohl bei Kampfflugzeugen als auch bei Firmenjets die Umsätze rapide und simultan gestiegen sind, was bedeutet, dass die Welt kriegerischer geworden ist und zugleich erheblich mehr Profite angehäuft werden. Zur größeren Nachfrage bei Luxusartikeln hat nicht nur das sprunghafte Wirtschaftswachstum in China und Indien beigetragen, sondern auch die Ausweitung des begrenzten militärisch-industriellen Komplexes zum blühenden Katastrophen-Kapitalismus-Komplex. Die weltweite Instabilität kommt heute nicht nur einer kleinen Gruppe von Waffenhändlern zugute, sie generiert auch riesige Profite auf dem Hightech-Sicherheitssektor, im Bereich Großbauwerke, für private medizinische Unternehmen, die verwundete Soldaten behandeln, in der Erdöl- und Erdgasbranche – und natürlich für militärische Dienstleistungen.“

Naomi Klein, Die Schock-Strategie, p.598f