What is American Exceptionalism?

So what is this "American Exceptionalism" after all? Is it just an expression of uniqueness which you can trivially apply to every thing or being? Or is it an announcement of vanity, patriotism or hubris? Is it a justification for acting like an international outlaw whenever suitable? Or is it a pseudo-religious belief? Wikipedia's definition: "Exceptionalism is the perception that a country, society, institution, movement, or time period is "exceptional" (i.e., unusual or extraordinary) in some way and thus does not need to conform to normal rules or general principles." Does it apply to American Exceptionalism?

Let's, for starters, take a look at a short video summarizing recent contributions and where Ronald Reagan's son puts it in a nutshell: whatever it is, we have to sell it! 

Michael Reagan: "Because I travel around the world myself, you know, people come up to me all the time and say "America can't fail. The world cannot afford America to fail". We are an exceptional exceptional country and we have to sell that!"

Is 'American Exceptionalism' Becoming Passé? - CBN.com, 30-03-2011

Is 'American Exceptionalism' Becoming Passé? -... von cbnonline

This post is subsequently divided into the following paragraphs:
1. Some Scholarly Views on American Exceptionalism
2. Some Recent Video and Audio Contributions
Enjoy!


1. Some Scholarly Views on American Exceptionalism

Let's now study some scholarly views and approaches. The following selection of quotes is rather accidental and ranges from historical perspectives to USA-EU comparisons.

"American political culture is tied up with American exceptionalism, the view that American society and culture are exceptional in comparison with other advanced industrial democracies. In a sense this is true of all societies and cultures, but supporters of this view suggest that there are several features peculiar to US politics and society that distinguish the country from other Western democracies. It was the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville, who first wrote of ‘American exceptionalism’, back in 1835. He saw the United States as ‘a society uniquely different from the more traditional societies and status-bound nations of the Old World’. It was ‘qualitively different in its organising principles and political and religious institutions from . . . other western societies’, some of its distinguishing features being a relatively high level of social egalitarianism and social mobility, enthusiasm for religion, love of country, and ethnic and racial diversity." Watts, Duncan: Understanding US/UK Government and Politics. A Comparative Guide. Manchester University Press, Manchester, New York, 2003.

Alexis de Tocqueville (1805-1859)

American exceptionalism

"The idea that the United States has a unique, relatively homogeneous society and culture, based upon ideas of liberty, individualism and populism. Scholars and politicians alike have used this notion of exceptionalism to explain various aspects of American history: the failure, for example, of this country to develop deeper social fault lines between the interests of capital and labour. This perceived exceptionalism has prompted many Americans to believe they have a superior culture to others around the world. Most Americans certainly consider the US to be a unique bastion of freedom, while many contend the values of this exceptionalism should be exported abroad." Thomson, Alex: A Glossary of US Politics and Government. Edinburgh University Press Ltd, Edinburgh, 2007.

GEORGE BANCROFT AND AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM

(1800-1891)

"In his belief that America’s historical development fulfilled a divine purpose and his belief that the Revolution represented a turning point in human history, Bancroft articulated two of the central assumptions of American exceptionalism. The Revolution was, for Bancroft, a turning point because it had brought about the realization of America’s destiny to advance the cause of liberty. Structuring his analysis around the development of liberty in America, Bancroft dated this development back to the Reformation and began his history with the colonial era. Bancroft emphasized the role of the New England Puritans in developing and transplanting the principles of democracy and liberty to America, for, as he put it, Puritanism was “religion struggling for the People”.
This account of the origins of liberty served political and social purposes. An ardent Jacksonian, Bancroft gave historical legitimacy to the democratic principles he espoused by tracing their roots in the past. Bancroft’s emphasis on the Puritan contribution to democracy reflected his own sectional loyalties: by locating the roots of democracy in New England, Bancroft asserted the primacy of his own region in American development and defined the nation in terms of New England. At the same time Bancroft’s history also served nationalist purposes. Recognizing that Puritanism was just one of the many strands that contributed to American independence, Bancroft gave credit to victims of Puritan persecution, like Roger Williams, and to William Penn and the settlers of Virginia for instituting the principles of liberty in their respective regions. Bancroft thus sought to instill national unity by giving each section a role in the advance of democracy. The other major theme of Bancroft’s history was the development of union in America.
With the Revolution, Bancroft believed, America had embarked on a process of continual progress. While the principles of the Revolution did not require a dramatic change in the nation’s social or political system, the vitality of the principles themselves made them a source of continual renovation and reform for Bancroft. In his belief that the nation could remain indefinitely in a state of revolution without undergoing fundamental change, Bancroft summed up the exceptionalist vision of America as a nation that was exempt from the normal processes of historical change and decay. In this vision, by virtue of its closeness to nature, the United States could remain in a state of perpetual innocence and simplicity, untouched by the social forces that had corrupted the Old World."Gabler-Hover, Janet & Sattelmeyer, Robert (eds.): American History through Literature (1820-1870). Thomson Gale, Detroit, New York, 2006.

PROTESTANTISM
[...]
PROTESTANT BEGINNINGS

"The story of Protestantism in nineteenth-century America begins with events that unfolded three centuries earlier. The first recorded use of the term “Protestant” in English dates to 1539, when it was applied specifically to those German princes and their subjects who protested the Roman Catholic Church’s efforts to silence Martin Luther and bring an end to the Reformation. Initially, the word “Protestant” applied only to Lutherans in Germany, whereas the Swiss and French followers of John Calvin called themselves “Reformed.” By the early seventeenth century, however, the term had come to be applied to all Western Christians who repudiated papal authority and Catholic doctrine. For a complex set of reasons, it was to be Protestants who undertook the colonization of North America in earnest, as Dutch Calvinists settled along the Hudson River, Anglicans moved to the mid-Atlantic coast, and Puritans followed two decades later to Massachusetts Bay. The Massachusetts Bay Colony would have an enduring significance out of all proportion to its initial size and stature. Many of the most dynamic Protestant influences in American life stemmed from the belief system and cultural practices of this group of several hundred settlers. Long after most Americans had let go of the bracing theology of the Puritans, they continued to embrace a form of the Puritan vision of American destiny. The first governor of the Massachusetts colony, John Winthrop (1588–1649), famously outlined that vision in a sermon written before or during the 1630 voyage that brought his group to the New World. Winthrop titled his sermon “A Model of Christian Charity” and in it elaborated the covenantal understanding at the heart of Puritan theology. For these Calvinists, the covenant was a legal agreement between God and his chosen people: “We have entered into Covenant with Him for this Work, we have taken out a Commission, the Lord hath given us leave to draw our own Articles.” If the Puritan colonists kept the terms of the covenant, God would make them “a praise and glory,” and all other plantations in the New World would declare, “Make [us] like that of New England.” This small band of emigrants at the edge of the known world would become “a City upon a Hill,” with “the eyes of all people” upon them. By settling in New England, these Protestants would not be pursuing their own destiny, but, as God’s representatives, they would be carving out of the wilderness the kingdom of God. Although it was only one among the many voices clamoring to be heard in the colonies, Puritanism would come to direct the cultural conversation of America in a number of surprising ways. Early on, for example, it developed an interpretive discipline that involved an exceptionally close reading of personal experience and natural phenomena, as these Protestants scoured their souls and searched their world for signs of God’s coming kingdom. Even when Puritanism eventually fell out of favor, the interpretive habits it had inspired continued to thrive in new and different forms, whether in the prose of Henry David Thoreau (1817–1862) or the poetry of Emily Dickinson (1830–1886) and Robert Frost, in the fiction of Nathaniel Hawthorne (1804–1864), Herman Melville (1819–1891), and William Faulkner, or in the late-twentieth and early-twenty-first-century essays of Barry Lopez and Wendell Berry. Over several centuries, the Puritan practice of closely reading nature and experience consistently demonstrated a remarkable tenacity. Like other elements of the Puritan vision, it was compelling enough in its content and flexible enough in its form to adapt to changing cultural tastes. Later scholars, however, intensely debated the nature and extent of that Puritan cultural influence. Some argued that the claims made on behalf of Puritanism by Perry Miller, Sacvan Bercovitch, and others obscured the vital contributions of other religious traditions to American literature and culture. At the same time, other observers questioned the very notion of American exceptionalism that lies behind the argument of Protestant influence. Spanish Catholics were here long before the English arrived, this line of reasoning goes, and native peoples lived on the land for thousands of years before the first European settlers set foot on North American soil. Since Roman Catholics and Anabaptists, freethinkers and tribal worshippers all played crucial roles in American religious history, on what grounds do we
single out the efforts of a small band of Protestants from northwestern Europe?
     In the end, such questions can be answered only by carefully charting influence in the many instances where it can be traced. As a case in point, seventeenth century New England churches stressed individual experience in a manner that was to shape the larger culture profoundly. The Puritans conceived of the church as a gathering of freely consenting individuals. They made it a requirement that to become a member of the church, each man and woman had to undergo a harrowing conversion, which involved turning away from sin and breaking with the past. If you were a Puritan, in other words, you could not receive your faith from your parents but had to achieve it on your own. Whereas for centuries birth had determined membership in the Roman Catholic Church and many early Protestant denominations, in New England conversion and consent were required before a church could be called into being.
The Puritan practice of establishing “gathered churches” led to the creation of what the sociologist Robert Bellah, the philosopher Charles Taylor, and others have called an American cultural tradition of “leaving home.” Like their Puritan ancestors struggling to establish their own distinct relationship with God, countless later Americans would take it as a given that they had to make their own way in the world, free of the determining influence of parents and past. Thus we find established in American culture a paradoxical tradition of leaving tradition behind, or, to put it another way, our social expectation is for individuals to grow and prosper without paying heed to social expectations. In America, Jews and Christians, Muslims and pagans all adopt this tradition of abandoning tradition, and had it not been for the seeds sown by the early Protestant settlers, it is hard to imagine that such a tradition would have taken root so deeply in the soil of American culture."Gabler-Hover, Janet & Sattelmeyer, Robert (eds.): American History through Literature (1820-1870). Thomson Gale, Detroit, New York, 2006.

PURITANISM

"The influence of American Puritanism is pervasive in the literature of the nineteenth century. The uniquely American Puritan vision of the seventeenth century arose from the English Puritanism that engendered it. Indeed many first-generation American Puritans, such as John Cotton (1584–1652) and John Winthrop (1588–1649), were emigrants from England who sought religious freedom in the New World. First-, second-, and third-generation American Puritans developed and refined a special vision of Calvinist theology that has continued to influence American self-definition into the present. When Ronald Reagan argued in his 1980 presidential campaign that the United States had lost much of its former glory and should return to its position of past leadership in the world, he quoted John Winthrop’s sermon “A Model of Christian Charity” (1630), delivered 350 years earlier during the sea voyage that ended in establishment of the Massachusetts Bay Colony:

He shall make us a praise and glory, that men shall

say of succeeding plantations: “The Lord make it

like that of New England.” For we must consider

that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all

people are upon us. So that if we shall deal falsely

with our God in this work we have under-taken,

and so cause Him to withdraw His present help

from us, we shall be made a story and a by-word

through the world: we shall open the mouths of

enemies to speak evil of the ways of God and all

professors for God’s sake; we shall shame the faces

of many of God’s worthy servants, and cause their

prayers to be turned into curses upon us, till we be

consumed out of the good land whither we are going.

This declaration succinctly articulates what has come to be known as American exceptionalism. At the root of American society and culture lie a vision of uniqueness and a sense of mission. In the introduction to her American Exceptionalism, Deborah L. Madsen states,

Nearly one hundred thousand Puritan
immigrants living in America by 1700

Exceptionalism describes the perception of Massachusetts Bay colonists that as Puritans they were charged with a special spiritual and political destiny: to create in the New World a church and a society that would provide the model for all the nations of Europe as they struggled to reform themselves (a redeemer nation). . . . Thus America and Americans are special, exceptional, because they are charged with saving the world from itself and, at the same time, America and Americans must sustain a high level of spiritual, political and moral commitment to this exceptional destiny— America must be as “a city upon a hill” exposed to the eyes of the world.
This Puritan notion of election, divine sanction, and high purpose has pervaded American identity, politics, and culture ever since, although it has evolved over several centuries from a specifically religious vision into a much more secular one: rather than exemplifying a pure church America’s mission became exemplifying a free, egalitarian, democratic society."Gabler-Hover, Janet & Sattelmeyer, Robert (eds.): American History through Literature (1820-1870). Thomson Gale, Detroit, New York, 2006.

MANIFEST DESTINY

"Another prominent nineteenth-century American theme closely associated with the “city upon a hill” and American exceptionalism is the idea of Manifest Destiny. In 1845 a journalist named John O’Sullivan (1813–1895) first used the term in an editorial for the United States Magazine and Democratic Review, in which he advocates the annexation of Texas, declaring that it is America’s “manifest destiny to overspread the continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying millions”. It has been an important by-word of American development and progress ever since. Manifest Destiny was easy to understand as God’s divine intention for America to expand westward, sanctioning the removal of Indians from their lands and the war with Mexico that resulted in America’s acquisition of Texas and much of what is now New Mexico and southern California. The ideology of Manifest Destiny inherited by nineteenth-century writers from the canonical literature of the preceding centuries, captured the imagination of Americans as their frontiers expanded westward, from the Lewis and Clark expedition of 1804–1806 to the linking of east and west in the transcontinental railroad in 1869. Walt Whitman (1819–1892) was only one of many American writers who embraced the idea of divine progress in the expansion of the United States." Gabler-Hover, Janet & Sattelmeyer, Robert (eds.): American History through Literature (1820-1870). Thomson Gale, Detroit, New York, 2006.

John Gast: American Progress

Sociology of Education

"The highly selective review of empirical studies that follows focuses on the two key questions in contemporary American sociology of education: (1) How is education involved in the distribution of life chances? (2) How are family status and school characteristics connected to educational attainment and/or academic achievement? With few exceptions, analyses of education in other countries are not considered. The field is dominated by American research, and American sociologists have engaged in relatively little comparative research. Baker (1994) speculates that this lack of a comparative research tradition in the United States reflects both a belief in American ‘‘exceptionalism’’ (for instance, an extreme emphasis on mass access) and a strong focus on micro-level issues that do not necessarily call for comparative research designs." Borgatta, Edgar F. &  Montgomery, Rhonda J. V. (eds.):  Encyclopedia of Sociology (2nd ed.) Vol.5. Macmillan Reference USA, New York.

Doing the History of United States

"To study U.S. foreign relations is not to assume that the United States has been responsible for every change or problem in the world, that U.S. power is unlimited, or that weaker nations do not possess countervailing power. We need to be aware of the reception issue – how influences from the United States have been received and often altered by recipient nations or groups. Foreign relations history has come a long way since the days of the “nationalist” school of Samuel Flagg Bemis, whose 1961 presidential address to the American Historical Association assumed that the United States was exceptional, for the growth of the American empire extended the “blessings of liberty.” According to Bemis, whites migrated through an “empty continent,” a metaphor that masked the harsh removal of American Indians and the expansion of African American slavery. Although written history has become more inclusive, the grand narrative of American exceptionalism still prevails in public discussions of the past and, more subtly, in some historical scholarship. A grand or master narrative is a foundational story, widely told and retold, that shapes the overall framework in which most history is written and remembered, and that makes only some evidence (in Bemis’s formulation, the liberty of white males) seem relevant. The grand narrative of American exceptionalism assumes, first, that the “rise” of the United States to global power resulted from preeminence descending upon “America,” a divinely favored nation with unique freedoms. Like a Horatio Alger tale,  American exceptionalism is a rags-to-riches story that focuses on the luck and pluck and not on the stealing and killing entailed in becoming a continental and then a global empire. According to this compelling arrative, the United States, despite some mistakes, generally uses its power for benign purposes, a belief that has made it easier to cover up some foreign policy scandals. Another premise is that most people in the world appreciate, or should appreciate, U.S. beneficence. Related assumptions are that U.S.-style capitalism multiplies wealth and opportunity for nearly all; that human progress and happiness are best measured by such wealth and opportunity; that U.S.-style democracy enables the best “man” to be elected, as Woodrow Wilson put it; that U.S. influence is directed toward global peace, prosperity, and democracy; and finally, that the triumph over communism and ascendancy of global markets might mean the “end of history.”
      This grand narrative is told and retold in schools, in most of the media, in churches, and by public authorities. Like a myth, the story of American exceptionalism does have partial validity. The key point, however, is that because this narrative is so satisfying to many people, and because this narrative is retold by such powerful institutions, that partial validity often becomes accepted as the whole story. A master of persuasive narrative, the commentator and novelist Joan Didion acknowledges that constructing narratives requires many “tacit agreements, small and large, to overlook the observable in the interests of obtaining a dramatic story line.” U.S. grand narratives have relied on similar “tacit agreements” to secure dramatic, self-congratulatory story lines. The historian Michael Adas notes that American exceptionalism is not only “more comprehensive and extreme than its counterparts elsewhere,” but it “has also proven a good deal more impervious than most other national variants of divinely inspired mission to the unsettling excesses of human folly and cruelty that have abounded in the twentieth century.” Too few foreign policy makers have followed John Quincy Adams, who balanced his commitment to that “divinely inspired mission” with his understanding that going “abroad, in search of monsters to destroy” would endanger the nation’s freedoms. Instead, many leaders have won at least initial domestic support by couching foreign intervention in terms of the grand narrative. Most foreign conflicts have largely been remembered and recorded in ways that embellish the story. Although cynicism, dissent, criticism, and revisionism have persisted among the general public, counter narratives have generally remained as fragments or as conspiracy myths.

       Inconsistencies in the story, such as the dictatorship and poverty in Guatemala following the U.S. intervention in 1954, or the economic breakdown in Russia following the “shock therapy” of U.S. private and governmental advisers after 1991, have largely been ignored, or explained as necessary or inevitable “transitions” by most U.S. observers. Although triumphalists have argued that the supposed U.S. “victory” in the ColdWar affirmed the grand narrative, other scholars have countered that the Cold War ended because of largely autonomous changes in the Soviet Union. Historians who have analyzed specific aspects of U.S. relations with, say, Guatemala or Russia, have pointed to the holes in the master story." Costigliola, Frank & Paterson Thomas G.: "Defining and Doing the History of United States" in Paterson Thomas G. & Hogan, Michael J. Explaining the History of American Foreign Relations (2nd ed.). Cambridge University Press, New York, 2004.

"Internationally, the renewed influence of religious actors coincided with a growing willingness of U.S. foreign policy elites, mainly secular in orientation, to privilege force over diplomacy and unilateral over multilateral action—a trend most evident in Washington’s declaration in September 2001 of the War on Terror and the U.S. invasion of Iraq in March 2003. It would be a mistake to reduce the influence of religion in U.S. foreign policy to the G. W. Bush presidency and its immediate predecessors. The historical roots of that influence go far deeper. An expansive scholarly literature explores the origins and manifestations of a deep strain of religious messianism that runs through the master narrative of America’s claims of exceptionalism as a nation-state. From the founding myth of Puritan settlement of the New World as a struggle for religious freedom, to the articulation of the doctrine of Manifest Destiny as a rationale for America’s westward territorial expansion, to Wilsonian internationalism as a public service creed, and the definition of the cold war as a battle with atheistic communism, religion and a religious political culture have been a constant element in “the longstanding U.S. view of itself as morally superior, and therefore exceptional vis-à-vis other powers.” Prodromou, Elizabeth H.: "U.S. Foreign Policy and Global Religious Pluralism" in Banchoff, Thomas (ed.):  Religious Pluralism, Globalization, and World Politics. Oxford University Press. Oxford, New York, 2008.

EU in comparison to USA

"The Presbyterian tradition of America as “God’s chosen country” gives Americans great moral assurance. Their self-image of a “city upon the hill” provides a yardstick with which they measure other actors and distinguish between good and evil forces. In recent years religious fundamentalism has further gained in strength, especially among the conservative right. While in the 1980s President Ronald Reagan stigmatized the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” that belonged on the “ash heap of history,” President Bush has associated Iran, Iraq, and North Korea with an “axis of evil” that needs to be eradicated. From this belief springs the conviction that, if freedom and democracy were brought to the lands of darkness, their people would embrace these values enthusiastically, defeating radicalism and terrorism. The Bush administration’s interventions have been characterized as a mixture of “Wilsonianism and power,” or, in Pierre Hassner’s words, as “Wilsonianism in boots.” The rhetoric of freedom is more than a cloak for self-interest, and disappointment in Iraq has been a setback but no ground yet for changing America’s moral course. In contrast, European societies have become widely secularized though religious beliefs still influence individual behavior. The European project can be seen as a secular humanist application of the Enlightenment. Memories of two world wars and the holocaust, though, prevent most Europeans from entertaining as Manichean views as spring from American exceptionalism."Haftendorn, Helga: "EU–US Cooperation on Non-European Issues",  in Lundestad, Geir (ed.):  Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008

"The US public, socialized within a strong national narrative of American exceptionalism, responds to missionary concepts of global transformation. European publics, in contrast, are preoccupied with different national constraints and traditions. There is no comparable European narrative, no foundation for an instinctive European vision of global order and international role, no more than there is a European federation to balance the United States. It is part of the myth of American exceptionalism that people of reason and goodwill in other countries should share America’s view of the world.
Wallace, William: "Leadership or Partnership?" in Lundestad, Geir (ed.):  Just Another Major Crisis? The United States and Europe since 2000. Oxford University Press, New York, 2008

2. Some Recent Video and Audio Contributions

• Senator Sam Brownback speaks about American Exceptionalism

• Unknown Panelist

"I would define American exceptionalism as a belief in American uniqueness and American chosenness: that whether we are chosen by God or chosen by providence that - we collectively - have a special mission to the world and in crudest terms the mission is to remake the world in our own image based on the conviction that American principles are universal principles."

• Howard Zinn: Lecture on "The Myth of American Exceptionalism"

March 14, 2005, Running Time: 1:32:02
"sometimes [...] if you criticize the United States of America [...] you're met witht the exhortation "So why don't you go somewhere else?". [...] A friend of mine who is a comedian [...] and in his serious comedy he would very often be critical of certain things that the United States had done in the world. And if people would say "so why don't you move somewhere else", he would say "I don't wanna move somewhere else because I don't wanna become the victim of American Foreign policy"." (Howard Zinn)

• David Rieff: The Death of American Exceptionalism

"In such a situation [economy] the United States cannot exert the kind of hegemony that made the idea of American exceptionalism possible. Because the idea of American Exceptionalism and the idea of American hegemony go hand in hand.Maybe not at the beginning of the republic - you know, the shing city on the hill and all that - but in the induration that American Exceptionalism has had, certainly in the eighteen-nineties, since this creation of this informal American empire in the Philippines and in Cuba and elsewhere."

• American Exceptionalism Vs. European Socialism (radio interview, 5 parts, religious)

Dennis Prager: "You have the best description of what I call the "soullessness" Of Europe.
Charles Murray (senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute): I'm afraid that what happens is that the European system takes too much the life out of life. And by that I mean - as far as I can tell - there is among Europe's young people a spreading mentality which goes like this: human beings are collections of chemicals ... and they're activated and then, for a period of time, they're deactivated. And, the purpose of life is to while away the time as pleasently as possible between activation and deactivation. [...] Here's what bothers me about Europe: it is the most secular civilization in world history. No other civilization has tried to survive as a secular civilization the way they're trying to do ... and I don't think they can do it."

• Newt Gingrich Explains American Exceptionalism

"Despite the fact that our current president has managed to avoid explaining - at least on four occasions - that we're endowed by our creator -  that fact is what makes American Exceptionalism different is that we are the only people I know of in history who say "power comes directly from God to each one of you". You are personally a sovereign, so you are always a citizen and you're never a subject."

• What Is American Exceptionalism?

President Obama: "I believe in American exceptionalism just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British
exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism."
Newt Gingrich: "President Obama's explanation of American exceptionalism is truly alarming. President Obama did not understand the question and did not have any idea of what American exceptionalism is."

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Here's the full quote of the President's viewpoint:

"I believe in American exceptionalism, just as I suspect that the Brits believe in British exceptionalism and the Greeks believe in Greek exceptionalism. I'm enormously proud of my country and its role and history in the world. If you think about the site of this summit and what it means, I don't think America should be embarrassed to see evidence of the sacrifices of our troops, the enormous amount of resources that were put into Europe postwar, and our leadership in crafting an Alliance that ultimately led to the unification of Europe. We should take great pride in that.And if you think of our current situation, the United States remains the largest economy in the world. We have unmatched military capability. And I think that we have a core set of values that are enshrined in our Constitution, in our body of law, in our democratic practices, in our belief in free speech and equality, that, though imperfect, are exceptional.Now, the fact that I am very proud of my country and I think that we've got a whole lot to offer the world does not lessen my interest in recognizing the value and wonderful qualities of other countries, or recognizing that we're not always going to be right, or that other people may have good ideas, or that in order for us to work collectively, all parties have to compromise and that includes us.And so I see no contradiction between believing that America has a continued extraordinary role in leading the world towards peace and prosperity and recognizing that that leadership is incumbent, depends on, our ability to create partnerships because we create partnerships because we can't solve these problems alone."

• Btw, Newt Gingrich: go here http://www.CityUponAHill.com, or watch A City Upon A Hill: The Spirit Of American Exceptionalism - Official Trailer

• Russia Today CrossTalk: American Exceptionalism

• And finally, a contribution of the more refreshing style by this young American lady "cateematthews", playing the anti-hegemonic card, surely not the worst:

"A think a world without hegemony, without superpowers would be a fine one to live in and I often look forward to it. But every country more that's exceptional, every country that is developing and producing and evolving is one more for a struggling world."

Readiness for War of the European Population under US-American Leadership?

Recently in the German online magazine „Spiegel“: „Deutsche wünschen sich starke USA“ - („Germans Desire Strong USA“) - an uncritical summary of a per se questionable statistics. Quite a few German might have asked themselves: whom did they interview?

At least, the apprentice of this kind of copy & paste journalism indicated the source: the survey "Transatlantic Trends", contracted by the German Marshall Fund (GMF). The entry in the English Wikipedia displays the warning that the article on the GMF would „be written like an advertisement“ (say crude propaganda).

Exactly the same way – like propaganda – the article in the Spiegel is written. Marginally modified, it was adopted from the website of the GMF: Press Release: 10 Years After 9/11, Europeans Still Desire Strong U.S. Leadership in World. Here are the questions and „results“:

The questions taken as a whole aim at depicting readiness for war of the European population under US-American Leadership (just put the pieces together). According to the GMF, the survey was carried out bei the Compagnia di San Paolo  (sample size, where, how, when, why – details unknown). On its website that Compagnia is called a „charitable brotherhood, founded in Torino in 1563“. Moreover, the brotherhood is member of the European Foundation Centre  which – as a chief task – is preparing the smooth cross border operating of funds in the EU, and of the  ACRI – Association of Italian Foundations and Saving Banks.  Both are lobby organizations.

The question, „if under certain conditions war is necessary to obtain justice“ is a typical suggestive question. 

In the course of a live interview the interviewee probably will not be aware of the last part of the question containing the word 'justice'. And, of course, „some conditions“ can be imagined for almost everything ...

Die Kriegsbereitschaft der europäischen Bevölkerung unter US-amerikanischer Führung?

Kürzlich im „Spiegel“ online: „Deutsche wünschen sich starke USA“ - eine kritiklose Zusammenfassung einer an sich eher unglaubwürdigen Stastik. Da werden sich viele Deutsche gewundert haben: wen haben die bloß gefragt?

Wenigstens erwähnt der Copy&Paste Praktikant die Quelle: die Umfrage "Transatlantic Trends", in Auftrag gegeben vom German Marshall Fund (GMF). Der englischsprachige Eintrag in Wikipedia enthält die Warnung, der Artikel über den GMF sei wie eine Werbung geschrieben (sprich unkritische Propaganda).

Und genauso – wie Propaganda – liest sich der Artikel im Spiegel. Abgeschrieben wurde von der website des GMF: Press Release: 10 Years After 9/11, Europeans Still Desire Strong U.S. Leadership in World. Hier die Fragen und „Ergebnisse“.

Die Fragen insgesamt zielen darauf ab die Kriegsbereitschaft der europäischen Bevölkerung unter amerikanischer Führung darzustellen. Durchgeführt soll die Umfrage von der Compagnia di San Paolo worden sein (Stichprobenumfang, wo, wie, wann, wieso – Details unbekannt). Diese Compagnia beschreibt sich selbst auf ihrer Website als „karitative Bruderschaft, gegründet in Turin 1563“. Ferner ist sie ein Mitglied des European Foundation Centres, zu dessen Hauptaufgaben es zählt, das reibungslose Funktionieren von Stiftungen über EU-Grenzen hinweg vorzubereiten, und der ACRI – Association of Italian Foundations and Saving Banks -  zu deutsch: des Interessenverbandes der Italienischen Stiftungen und Sparkassen. Beide sind Lobby-Verbände.

Die Frage, ob unter gewissen Umständen Krieg notwendig sei, um Gerechtigkeit herzustellen, ist eine typische Suggestivfrage. Bei einem Live- oder Telefoninterview hört der Interviewte den letzten Satzteil mit 'Gerechtigkeit' wahrscheinlich gar nicht mehr. Und "gewisse Umstände" lassen sich für fast alles ausmalen.

A Must See Chomsky Interview

BBC journalist Jeremy Paxman is here trying to lead Chomsky up the garden path with partly provocating, but also crucial questions. Main topics are the ongoing Arab revolts and how the Western states are supposed to react, the role of technology and the internet with regard to the revolts and ... stupid people. Here are some highlights and cliffhangers:

Part I

[...]

Paxman: What should the West be doing?

Chomsky: For example, the Arab press – if you read it, including from London - is proposing that countries which have some respect in the region become involved, namely Egypt and Turkey. That would make a lot more sense than countries that are hated ... for good reasons.

Pacman: So, what do we do, just do nothing?

Chomsky: First, we're not asked to do anything. Mostly we've been asked to stay away. Just read what is being said. Mostly: "Stay away! You've got enough blood on your hands already. The question what to do is not up to us. We're not the only ones in the world.

Paxman: Sure.

Chomsky: So, say Brazil for example, is a respected country, so is Turkey. If you look at the Arab world, ask yourself: which leader is most respected? [...]

Paxman: We have an obligation - do we not – to behave responsibly.

Chomsky: Yes.

Paxman: And you're saying that the responsible thing is to simply not getting involved.

Chomsky: There may come a time when it would make sense for the West to become involved despite of its horrendous record of atrocities and crimes, in that region too [...]. But the question is: has this time come? There are other which have a much better status and may be able to do things that would lead to some sort of reconciliation or at least mediation. I mean it's very possible that Libya is going to break up into two states.

[...]

Paxman: We know [...] how you regard Bush's and Blair's record in the Middle-East. Do you think Obama has known better?

Chomsky: In many ways he's worse.

Paxman (laughing): Why? [...] Why is he worse?

Chomsky: Shall we go through the details?

Paxman: Please!

[...]

On Chomsky's famous saying "If the nuremberg Laws were applied ..." 

Paxman: You famously said that every American president since the 2^nd World War would fail in the judgement as applied in Nuremberg and therefore [...] should be hanged. [...]

Chomsky: I didn't say that. Not everybody was hanged at Nuremberg. I said that if we believed in the Nuremberg Principles, every American president would be subject to them. What the decision would be we have to check. [...]

Paxman: But Obama would fare no better if the principles were applied to him?

Chomsky: No, ... he's carrying out a major war in Afghanistan ... he's directly involved in aggressive and criminal actions carried out by Israel for example ...

--------------------------------------------------------

Part II

[..]

Paxman: Can I finish with a personal question? You're how old now?

Chomsky: 82.

Paxman: Why haven't you mellowed?

Chomsky: Because I look at the world. And there are things happening in the world which should lead anyone to become indignant, outraged, active and ... simply engaged.

[...]

Chomsky: Congress has already moved to ban funding for the most mild evironmental efforts. Furthermore, unfortunately, many of these people are true believers. The head of one of the Congressional Subcommittees, a republican, explained that the global warming can't be a problem because God promised there would be no other flood.  [...]

Paxman: But why do you care about stupid people?

Chomsky: Stupid people? These people have power! They're carrying out the actions defunding possible efforts ...

[...]

And certainly, if one looks at stupid people, we'll find them all over the place. For example, we happened to be right in the middle of a huge financial crisis, people have noticed. If you trace that back, a lot of it comes from a fanatic religious belief in what is called the efficient market hypothesis. It's pure fanaticism – dominated the economics profession, dominated the Federal Reserve. One consequence was that when an 8 trillion dollar housing bubble developed – totally unrelated to any fundamentals, completely off the hundred years history of housing prices - the profession and the Fed and the Central Bank said it's not necessary to pay attention because of the efficient markets. I mean is that very different from "God promised Noah"?

Paxman: That's great. Thank you very much!

Brot und Spiele und Militär

Die US-Hegemonisten unter Friedensnobelpreisträger Obama intensivieren ihre militärischen Angriffe und arbeiten fleißig an der Installation der nächsten freundlich gesinnten Regierung im Jemen, berichtet die New York Times Online. Unumwunden wird von den US-Radikalen zugegeben, „daß das Ausmaß des amerikanischen Krieges im Jemen zu den bestgehütetsten Geheimnissen der Obama-Regierung zählte und sich „offizielle Stellen“ deshalb Sorgen machten, daß die Neuigkeit der „unilateralen Operationen“ den geschwächten Status des Präsidenten Saleh unterminieren könnte. Saleh hatte ab 2009 den USA beschränkte Militäreinsätze gestattet.

"The extent of America’s war in Yemen has been among the Obama administration’s most closely guarded secrets, as officials worried that news of unilateral American operations could undermine Mr. Saleh’s tenuous grip on power. Mr. Saleh authorized American missions in Yemen in 2009, but placed limits on their scope and has said publicly that all military operations had been conducted by his own troops."

Das derzeitige Chaos im Jemen kommt den Amerikanern sehr entgegen, heißt es doch, daß es den Spielraum der USA dort vergrößert.

“But as things get more and more chaotic in Yemen, the space for the Americans to operate in gets bigger”

Siehe: NY Times: "U.S. Is Intensifying a Secret Campaign of Yemen Airstrikes"

Immerhin können sich die Amerikaner im Kampf um den Jemen der Unterstützung ihres langjährigen Alliierten, des Gottesstaates Saudi-Arabien erfreuen. Dort wiederum versucht man sich vor der Bevölkerung zu schützen, indem man Almosen verteilt. Der NY Times zufolge gönnt König Abdullah seinen Beamten zwei zusätzliche Monatsgehälter und kümmert sich rührend um den Wohnbau für Niedriglohnrezipienten (70 Milliarden US$ immerhin). Die 200 Millionen zum Stillhalten des islamischen Klerus gehören da nur zu den Standardüberweisungen.

“But the first line of defense in this case was the public aid package. King Abdullah paid an extra two months’ salary to government employees and spent $70 billion alone for 500,000 units of low-income housing. As a reward to the religious establishment, he allocated about $200 million to their organizations, including the religious police. Clerics opposed to democratic changes crowed that they had won a great victory over liberal intellectuals.”

Bei weitem mehr wird der König allerdings für den erfolgreichen Kampf gegen Demokratiebestrebungen in seinem Hinterhof ausgeben müssen - Bahrain, Oman, oder die Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate.

“Saudi Arabia, a close ally of the United States, has struggled to preserve what remains of a regional dynamic upended by the Arab Spring — buttressing monarchies and blocking Iran from gaining influence.
While the United States has pressed other Arab nations to embrace democratic changes, it has remained largely silent on Saudi Arabia and the kingdom’s efforts to squelch popular revolts in neighboring Bahrain and Oman.”

Siehe NY Times: “In Saudi Arabia, Royal Funds Buy Peace for Now”

Zum Beispiel erinnert man sich in den Vereinigten Arabischen Emiraten daran, daß es hieß „Brot UND Spiele“. Durch gründliches Studium der in diesem Jahr vorausgegangenen Revolten erkannte man, daß sich die Leute ja keine Törtchen mehr leisten konnten und dachte sich, ein voller Bauch müsse doch nicht demonstrieren gehen – wogegen auch?

Siehe Spiegel: „Mit Billig-Koriander gegen die Revolution“ 

So kompliziert ist die Logik des Machterhalts ja nun doch nicht.

Friends of a Dictator

„The U.S. has an overwhelmingly powerful role there. Egypt is the second-largest recipient over a long period of U.S. military and economic aid. Israel is first. Obama himself has been highly supportive of Mubarak. It’s worth remembering that on his way to that famous speech in Cairo, which was supposed to be a conciliatory speech towards the Arab world, he was asked by the press—I think it was the BBC—whether he was going to say anything about what they called Mubarak’s authoritarian government. And Obama said, no, he wouldn’t. He said, "I don’t like to use labels for folks. Mubarak is a good man. He has done good things. He has maintained stability. We will continue to support him. He is a friend." And so on. This is one of the most brutal dictators of the region, and how anyone could have taken Obama’s comments about human rights seriously after that is a bit of a mystery. But the support has been very powerful in diplomatic dimensions. Military—the planes flying over Tahrir Square are, of course, U.S. planes. The U.S. is the—has been the strongest, most solid, most important supporter of the regime. It’s not like Tunisia, where the main supporter was France. They’re the primary guilty party there. But in Egypt, it’s clearly the United States, and of course Israel. Israel is—of all the countries in the region, Israel, and I suppose Saudi Arabia, have been the most outspoken and supportive of the Mubarak regime. In fact, Israeli leaders were angry, at least expressed anger, that Obama hadn’t taken a stronger stand in support of their friend Mubarak.“

From an interview with Noam Chomsky on Democracy Now!

http://www.zcommunications.org/this-is-the-most-remarkable-regional-uprising-that-i-can-remember-by-noam-chomsky

Noam Chomsky

„Die Rolle der USA ist unglaublich gewichtig. Ägypten ist das Land, das - nach Israel - die meiste amerikanische Militär- und Wirtschaftshilfe erhält und zwar schon sehr lange. Obama hat Mubarak auch persönlich massiv unterstützt. Man sollte nicht vergessen, dass Obama auf dem Weg nach Kairo, wo er seine berühmte angebliche "Versöhnungsrede" an die arabische Welt hielt, von der Presse gefragt wurde (ich glaube, es war die BBC), ob er auch etwas über die 'autoritäre Regierung Mubarak' (so deren Worte) sagen werde. Obama verneinte dies. Er sagte: "Ich mag es nicht, wenn man Leuten Etiketten verpasst. Mubarak ist ein guter Mann. Er hat gute Dinge getan.  Er hat die Stabilität aufrechterhalten. Wir werden ihn weiter unterstützen. Er ist ein Freund." Und so weiter. Dabei ist er (Mubarak) einer der brutalsten Diktatoren in der Region. Es wirkte schon ein wenig seltsam, wie manche Leute Obamas Kommentare zum Thema Menschenrechte danach noch ernstnehmen konnten. In diplomatischer Hinsicht war die Unterstützung (für Mubarak) sehr wirkungsvoll. Zum militärischen Bereich ist zu sagen, dass es sich bei den Flugzeugen, die über den Tahrir-Platz (in Kairo) fliegen, natürlich um amerikanische Flugzeuge handelt. Die USA sind - und waren - der mächtigste, konstanteste und wichtigste Unterstützer dieses Regimes. Mit Tunesien kann man das nicht vergleichen. Hauptunterstützer Tunesiens war Frankreich. Es trägt in diesem Fall die Hauptschuld. Im Falle Ägyptens allerdings ist Amerika, ganz klar, der Hauptschuldige - und natürlich Israel. Von allen Ländern in der Region hat Israel - und ich glaube Saudi-Arabien - das Mubarak-Regime am unverbrämtesten unterstützt. Die Führer Israels waren wütend - zumindest gaben sie sich wütend -, weil Obama sich nicht stärker für ihren Freund Mubarak eingesetzt hat.“

Noam Chomsky in an interview with Democracy Now! Translation by Andrea Noll in ZMAG.

III Warum Deutsche in Afghanistan kämpfen/Why Germans fight in Afghanistan

Teil 3 - Wenn Obama 'A' sagt ...

(Part 3 - When Obama says 'A' ...)

Moderator: Herr Stöbele, ich hab mir jetzt mal überlegt: ist es denn wirklich vollkommen unmöglich sich vorzustellen, dass die Kanzlerin zum Telefonhörer greift, Obama anruft und sagt: Barack – oder wie auch immer die miteinander reden, ich halt es jetzt hier nicht mehr durch. In meiner Bevölkerung wächst der Druck. Ich halt es jetzt hier nicht mehr durch! Da hat der Mann doch Verständnis. Ich meine, er ist doch auch [...] Mehrheitendenker [...]. Was passiert Ihrer Meinung nach dann?

(Host: Mr. Stroebele, I just came to my mind: is it really absolutely impossible to imagine our chancellor [Merkel] to make a phone call to Obama saying: Barack – or however they may address each other – I cannot keep up here. There is increasing preassure among the population. I can't keep it up anymore. Surely the man must sympathize. I mean he's [...] thinking in majorities. [...] What would happen next?) 

Hans-Christian Stroebele

Ströbele: Ja, ganz genau. Vor allen Dingen, die US-Regierungen, und auch die früheren, waren das ja von den Deutschen so gewohnt. Und ich bin nun wirklich kein Fan von Helmut Kohl. Aber Helmut Kohl hat das zum Beispiel beim ersten Golfkrieg gegen den immensen Druck der US-Amerikaner, damals Bush sr., durchgehalten. Er hat gesagt, "nein, in meiner Bevölkerung setze ich das nicht durch, kann ich das nicht durchsetzen".

(Stroebele: Yes, exactly. In the first line, the U.S. governments, including former ones, got accustomed to the Germans being what they are just like in this case. And I'm really not a fan of Helmut Kohl. But Helmut Kohl managed to withstand the immense pressure coming from the U.S. Americans, Bush sr. at that time. He said "no, I cannot push this through with my people".)

Moderator: Allerdings ist es dann ein bischen blöd, wenn im Bundestag dauernd alle die Hand heben und sagen, ja wir machen mit!

(Host: Though it's a little bit stupid if the Bundestag always puts its hands up saying "yes, we'll join you!)

Ströbele: Ja. Aber bei Obama ist die Situation noch völlig anders als bei den beiden Bushs, [...] weil er viel eher weiss, was es bedeutet, wenn man davon abhängig ist, wenn die Bevölkerung den Krieg nicht will. Er ist ja unter anderem auch an die Regierung gekommen, weil die Bevölkerung in den USA den Krieg im Irak loswerden wollte, weil er sich als Kandidat des Friedens dargestellt hat. Und genauso könnte die Kanzlerin kommen…

(Stroebele: Yes, but the situation with Obama is absolutely different to that of the Bushs, [...] because he rather knows much better what it means to be dependent on the fact that the people don't want the war. It was one of the reasons why he came into power: because the people in the USA wanted to get rid of the war in Iraq, because he presented himself as a candidate for peace. Just the same way our chancellor could come ...)

Moderator: Er sagt ja, es geht. Was ist ihre Befürchtung, was dann passiert? [...] Also ich komm mir auch manchmal so vor, als wären wir ein Minipopel-Land voller Idioten, die machen müssen, was andere sagen.

(Host: Suppose he says yes, OK. What's your worry about what could happen then? [...] Well, some times I have the impression as if we were a Minipopel*-Land full of idiots who have to do what others order them to do.)

Kujat: Die Kanzlerin muss doch nicht Obama anrufen. Die Kanzlerin kann auf der nächsten Sitzung in der NATO, denn wir operieren ja dort, innerhalb der NATO, da sagt sie: Wir sind ein souvärener Staat – ich meine,wir sind ein souvärener Staat. [...] Wenn die Kanzlerin sagt, "Leute am Ersten ist Schluss für uns!", dann ist schluss für uns! [...]

(Kujat: The chancellor [Merkel] doesn't have to call Obama. The chancellor may announce at the next NATO meeting – because we operate within the NATO – she may announce: "Guys, on the first [of some future month] we're out!" - then we will be out!) [...]

Moderator: Ich finde das wichtig, weil immer der Eindruck entsteht, ich kann leider nicht anders, ...

(Host: I find that important, because there is always the impression that we cannot do otherwise, ...)

Kujat: Ach was!

(Kujat: C'mon!)

Moderator: ... weil da sind die Amerikaner ...

(Host: ... because there are the Americans ...)

Harald Kujat

Kujat: Ach was!

(Kujat: C'mon!)

Moderator: ... und das Bündnis ...

(Host: ... and the alliance ...)

Kujat: Ach was!

(Kujat: C'mon!)

[...]

Kujat: Ich akzeptiere, dass jemand sagt "ich bin nicht bereit, die Konsequenzen zu tragen!".

Aber zu sagen, wir können nicht, ist Unsinn! Selbstverständlich können wir das!

(Kujat: I can accept someone saying that he's not ready to bear the consequences! But it's nonsense to say that we cannot leave Afghanistan"!)

Ströbele: Und vor allem, wir müssen erwähnen, auch wie sich das entwickelt hat. Noch vor zwei Jahren, noch vor einem Jahr, noch vor gut einem halben Jahr – wenn man da von Abzug geredet hat, von Exitstrategie – dann wendeten sich im Bundestag alle von einem ab, mit dem Ausdruck des Ekels und des Unverständnisses. Heute ist das in jeder Regierungserklärung. Warum? Weil Obama dieses Wort aufgenommen hat, das heisst, die reden ihm auch immer nur nach, der bestimmt sogar die Wortwahl dazu. Also er bestimmt die Diskussion, das ist doch absurd! Warum konnte man nicht vor einem halben Jahr, vor einem Jahr genauso darüber reden [...]?

(Stroebele: Above all, we have to mention something about the course of events, too. Even only half a year ago, everyone in the Bundestag turned away from you with the expression of disgust and incomprehension in their faces if you were talking of drawdown or exit strategy. Today it's written into each governmental statement. Why? Because Obama picked up the word. That means, they all just tell him what he wants to hear. He even determines the choice of words. Thus he determines the discussion, that's absurd! Why didn't they speak the same way one year earlier [...]?)

Moderator: OK. Kein schlechter Punkt. Anders gedacht, wir gehen mal kurz in den Gedankengang rein, und man würde jetzt rausgehen. [...] Dann war doch alles für die Katz. Ich meine, [...] dann sind die gestorben für nix! Dann haben wir nix erreicht, tote Leute und gehen zurück und der Taliban sitzt da und macht ...

(Host: Ok. Not a bad point. Put otherwise, let's just assume for a moment we would withdraw. [...] Then it would have been all for nothing. I mean [...] they would have died just for nothing! Then we didn't reach anything but dead people and leave and the Taliban is sitting there and does ...)

Kujat: Ich halte es mit Matthias Claudius, der gesagt hat: "Der eine fragt: was kommt danach? Der andere fragt: Ist es so recht? Und so unterscheidet sich der Freie von dem Knecht".** Wir sind frei. Wir müssen… haben aber auch die Verpflichtung zu überlegen, was bedeutet das für unser Land langfristig? Was bedeutet das für die Lage in diesem Raum? ... Pakistan sage ich nur. Was bedeutet das für unsere eigene Sicherheit? Das muss man bedenken. Aber auch das wird ja nicht getan. Es wird weder gesagt, was wir dort erreichen wollen, noch wird gesagt, was die Konsequenz werden, wenn wir rausgingen. Sondern, wir befinden uns in einem Schwebezustand – "muddling through" - "durchwurtscheln" im Grunde genommen. [...] Es wird ja nicht Politik gemacht, sondern man lässt sich treiben. Obama sagt 'A', dann sagen wir auch 'A'. Wir sind ein souvärenes Land, wir haben eigene Interessen. Und nur dann, wenn unsere eigenen Sicherheitsinteressen betroffen sind, sind wir verpflichtet, dort einzugreifen. Und das muss man klären! Im Bundestag findet doch keine Diskussion zu diesen Fragen statt.

(Kujat: I'm following Matthias Claudius who said "[German poetic verses]". We are free. But we also have the duty to consider what that means for our country in the long run? I just mention Pakistan. What does that mean for our own security? You have to consider that. But this is not done, too. They do not say what we want to achieve there nor what the consequences would be if we withdraw. Instead, we find ourselves in a state of uncertainty – "muddling through" after all. [..] It's not politics, it's drifting. Obama says 'A', then we say 'A', too. We are a sovereign country, we have our own interests. And only if our own security interests are affected, we have the duty to take action over there. And this is what has to be clarified. There are no discussions about these questions in the Bundestag.)

Moderator: Der Bundesinnenminister sagt an der einen oder anderen Stelle, es gibt diesen Zusammenhang seiner Meinung nach nicht: Also deutsche Soldaten töten Taliban, also steigt das Risiko hier. Das dreht man auch schnell mal um. Also es bedeutet, es ist gar keine Sicherheitsgefährdung durch Afghanistan und die Taliban in Deutschland. Dann ist es ja mehr als nur Durchwurschteln, dann ist es ja grotesk, vorsätzlicher Unfug.

(Host: The minister of internal affairs said somewhere that there is no such correspondence, meaning German soldiers killing Taliban would increase the risk. You can converse that easily – which would mean that there is no danger to security coming from Afghanistan or the Taliban in Germany. But then it's more than "muddling through", then it's bizarre, deliberate mischief.)

Ströbele: Aber lassen Sie mich zu Ihrer Argumentation noch etwas sagen. Wir können nicht sagen, weil jetzt dreiundvierzig Soldaten jetzt dort gestorben sind, müssen wir den Krieg weiterführen, weil, es darf doch nicht sein – ich sag mal, umsonst – gestorben sind.

(Stroebele: Please let me respond to your agumentation. We cannot say, because now that 43 soldiers have died, we have to continue the war for the soldiers would have "died for nothing" so-to-say. )

Kujat: Das halte ich auch für ... das ist ja Wahnsinn!

(Kujat: Me too, I believe that ... this is insane!)

Ströbele: Wir können doch nicht weitere Leute dort sterben lassen, genauso sinnlos, nur um zu rechtfertigen ...

(Stroebele: We just cannot go on letting people die down there, ony to justify ...

Kujat: Nein! Das kann nicht sein!

(Kujat: No! That's just not possible!)

from www.titanic-magazin.de

Ströbele: Das kann kein Argument sein, sondern da ist lang was schiefgelaufen, und ich sage von Anfang an was schiefgelaufen. Man hat ja ganz am Anfang, wenn Sie sich die Reden im Bundestag 2001 angucken, hat man mit einem halben Jahr Krieg gerechnet. Inzwischen sind wir im neunten Jahr und Herr McChrystal, er ist ausdrücklich danach gefragt worden, hat gesagt, vier bis fünf Jahre schätzt er ab 2011, das heisst, bis 2016, wenn alles positiv verläuft, dass man da raus geht. Das kann doch nicht wahr sein. Das kann doch nicht wahr sein! Deshalb sage ich, man muss in sinnvoller und verantwortungsvoller Weise rausgehen, d.h., man muss sofort anfangen zu deeskalieren, man muss sofort alle Offensiv-Kriegführung einstellen. Das kann man von heute auf morgen machen, zumindest, wo wir es können und wo wir zuständig sind – im Norden rund um Kunduz und muss mit den Leuten dort, mit den Taliban, mit den Dorfältesten und so weiter verhandeln. Und ich geh davon aus, dass solche Verhandlungen schwierig sind, dass man versucht dort was umzusetzen. Was überhaupt nicht geht, was im Augenblick praktiziert wird, nicht nur die Grossoffensiven, sondern dass die USA - und ich fürchte auch die Deutschen, die, mit denen verhandeln wollen -mit den Taliban, mit Todeskommandos jagen, mit extra-legalen Hinrichtungen, mit Raketen, aus Flugzeugen, mit Spezialkräften, die dann entweder gefangen nehmen oder killen oder töten – das ist ständig an der Tagesordnung und damit macht man doch Verhandlungen unmöglich. Es kann sich doch keiner outen als Verhandlungsbereiter, weil er sich in dem Augenblick eigentlich um sein Leben sorgen muss. 

(Stroebele: This cannot be an argument. In contrast, there was something going wrong and I tell you, it was going wrong right from the beginning. If you watch the speeches in the Bundestag in 2001, you realize that they expected half a year of war. In the meantime we are in the 9^th year and Mr. Chrstal answered - after being exlicitly asked – he estimated the war to go on for four or five more years – that means until 2016 to leave Afghanistan, if everything goes as planned. This cannot be true! This cannot be true! That's why I'm saying we have to leave in a reasonable and responsible way. That means, you have to start de-escalating immediately. You have to stop each and every aggressive warfare immediately. You can do that from one day to the other, at least in the region where we are responsible – in the north around Kunduz. And you have to negotiate with the people there – the Taliban, the village elders and so forth. I am assuming that such negotiations will be difficult in oder to achieve something there. What doesn't work at all – and that's currently being practiced there, not only with the major offensives – is that the USA and I'm afraid to say – the Germans - hunt and kill those Taliban with whom they are supposed to negotiate. There are hunting and killing special forces, hit squads, extra-legal executions, rockets from planes – that's the daily agenda and this is what makes negotiations impossible. No one can present himself as ready to negotiate because at the very same moment he's worried about his own life.)

[...]

-------End-------

* 'Minipopel' or 'Mini-Popel' is not a word of the German language which one could find in dictionaries but appears to be rather a(n admittedly) funny invention of the host Claus Strunz. 'Popel' is the German word for 'booger(s)', 'bogey', 'bit of a snot'.

**Kujat verwechselt hier Claudius mit Theodor Storm:

"Der Eine fragt: was kommt danach?

Der Andre fragt nur: ist es recht?

Und also unterscheidet sich

der Freie von dem Knecht."